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CHAPTER J 
Torts 
JAMES W. SMITH 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§3.1. Slander per se: Issues on a demurrer. It is settled law in 
Massachusetts that "words spoken orally are not actionable per se, 
unless they charge the plaintiff with a crime, or state that he is suffer-
ing from certain diseases, or prejudice him in his office, profession or 
business or may probably tend to do so." 1 The question before the 
Supreme Judicial Court in the 1959 SURVEY year decision, Cavarnos v. 
Kokkinakis,2 was whether a statement made by the defendant to the 
effect that the plaintiff, a teacher in a theological school, had tried to 
introduce communistic literature in the school and for that reason 
was about to be dismissed, could reasonably be found to be defamatory 
and to be prejudicial to the plaintiff in his profession as a teacher. 
In reversing the sustaining of the defendant's demurrer the Court an-
swered this question in the affirmative. 
It is widely held that an accusation of membership in the Com-
munist Party or of Communist affiliation or sympathy is defamatory.s 
Such accusations have further been held to constitute slander per se 
in tending to prejudice a person in his profession or business.4 The 
distinguishing feature of the Cavarnos case is that the defendant did 
not accuse the plaintiff of being a Communist or of having Communist 
affiliations but rather that he had tried to introduce communistic 
literature in the school and for that reason was about to be dismissed. 
The defendant argued that such a statement does not imply that 
the plaintiff is a Communist or has sympathy for the cause of Com-
munism since the introduction of communistic literature into a school 
may be solely for the edification and the broadening of the views of 
the students. The defendant further argued that his statement con-
cerning the dismissal would be compatible with a refusal on the part 
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§3.1. 1 Lynch v. Lyons, 303 Mass. 116, 118·119. 20 N.E.2d 953, 955 (1939). 
2338 Mass. 355. 155 N.E.2d 185 (1959). 
S See 1 Harper and James. The Law of Torts §5.l (1956). 
4 Remington v. Bentley. 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
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of a theological school to permit its students to be exposed to com-
munistic literature, whereas a college whose aim is a liberal education 
for its students might not take such a stand. 
In rejecting the defendant's argument the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated: 
To charge a teacher with an attempt to introduce Communistic 
literature in a school, as a result of which he was about to be dis-
missed from his position, could reasonably be found to mean that 
there had been an adjudication by some higher authority that 
the plaintiff's efforts were detrimental to the school at least in 
either or both of two respects: The Communistic literature was 
sought to be introduced not for literary or historical purposes but 
because (1) it was sponsored by the Communist Party or its agents 
or (2) it was in aid of the objectives of the Communist Party.5 
The position taken by the Supreme Judicial Court in the Cavarnos 
case seems quite proper. While the defendant's arguments might have 
some appeal to a fact finder, they do not appear sufficient for purposes 
of a demurrer. The issues raised by a demurrer in a case involving 
slander per se are whether the words can be reasonably understood in 
a defamatory sense6 and whether the attributes which they ascribe to 
the plaintiff could reasonably be regarded as being incompatible with 
the proper conduct of his trade, business or profession.7 As indicated 
by the Supreme Judicial Court, such words as those used by the de-
fendant could reasonably be understood in a defamatory sense and 
such attributes could reasonably be regarded as incompatible with the 
plaintiff's profession of teacher.s 
§3.2. Negligence: Liability of carriers for defective cars. In 1958, 
in the case of Flaherty v. New York, New Haven &- Hartford R.R.,l 
the Supreme Judicial Court held out some hope that it would not 
invoke too freely the intervening negligence exception to the doctrine 
of Carter v. Yardley &- CO.2 In 1959, in the case of Demers v. Illinois 
Central R.R.,8 the Court dashed any such hope. 
I) 338 Mass. 355, 357,155 N.E.2d 185,186 (1959). 
8 Muchnick v. Post Publishing Co., 332 Mass. 304, 125 N.E.2d 137 (1955) (issue 
raised on demurrer in a libel action). 
7 See I Harper Be James, The Law of Torts §!5.29 (1956). 
8 See Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954), 
discussed in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.5. There the Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld a dismissal by a school committee of a public school teacher for asserting 
his privilege against self-incrimination before a duly accredited subcommittee of the 
United States Senate by refusing to answer certain questions as to his alleged 
affiliation with and activities on behalf of Communism. 
§3.2. 1337 Mass. 456, 149 N.E.2d 670 (1958), discussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §3.1. 
2 The case of Carter v. Yardley Be Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), aban-
doned older notions requiring privity, holding that a "person owning or controlling 
a thing that ... is in a dangerous condition, either to his knowledge or as a result 
of his want of reasonable care in ... inspection, who deals with or disposes of that 
thini in a way that he foresees or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to 
2
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In the Flaherty case the plaintiff, an employee of a steve90ring com-
pany, complained of injuries received when a bag of asbestos fell on 
him. Evidence was offered that the bags had been improperly stacked 
by the defendant's employees on the premises of Moore-McCormack 
Lines. Relying partially upon the Yardley rule, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held the defendant liable despite the fact that the plaintiff in-
curred his injuries four days after the asbestos bags had left the control 
of the defendant. In answer to the defendant's contention that the 
case was within the intervening negligence exception to the Yardley 
rule, the Court stated: 
In the present case a jury conceivably could have found neglig~nce 
on the part of Moore-McCormack, which was in control of the as-
bestos and allowed it to remain in an unsafe condition. We are of 
the opinion, however, that even if there was superseding negli-
gence on the part of Moore-McCormack it does not relieve the 
defendant of liability. We think that the defendant should have 
foreseen that, even though Moore-McCormack had a duty to make 
the piles safe, it might not do SO.4 
In the Demers case the defendant railroad shipped materials' in a 
boxcar owned by it to Mississippi, where it was unloaded and turned 
over to an intermediate carrier, the Southern Railroad. The boxcar 
had an obvious jagged hole in its floor, which was found by the auditor 
to have been present at the time when the defendant transferred con-
trol of the car. Without repairing the hole, the Southern Railroad 
reloaded the car with materials consigned to the plaintiff's employer. 
The plaintiff was injured when he fell through the hole. Upon the 
ordering of a judgment for the defendant, the Illinois Central Rail-
road, by the trial judge, the plaintiff appealed, relying principally 
upon the Carterl) and Flaherty6 cases. Without referring to the Flah-
erty case in its opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court found no error 
in the order for judgment. It held that, since the Southern Railroad 
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the car but rerouted it without 
repairing the floor, its negligence became a superseding cause, thus 
breaking the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and 
the plaintiff's injury. Since Southern's acts were not such as would 
foresee will probably carry that thing into contact with some person" known or 
unknown, who will probably be ignorant of the danger, owes a legal duty to every 
such person to use reasonable care to prevent injury to him." The case, however, 
recognizes an exception to this general rule when the causal relation of the negli-
gence to the injury is broken by an intervening cause such as the negligence or 
fault of another, provided such intervening negligence cpu~ not have been fore-
seen. 
s 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 847, 158 N.E.2d 672. 
4337 Mass. 456, 462, 149 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1958). 
I) Carter v. Yardley Be Co., 319 Mass. 92,64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). 
6 Flaherty v. New York, New Haven Be Hartford R.R., 337 Mass. 456. 149 N.E.2d, 
670 (1958). 
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reasonably be expected by the defendant, the case fell within the 
intervening negligence exception to the Yardley rule. 
The Court also cited in its opinion the pre-Yardley case, Glynn v . ../ 
Central R.R./ the facts of which are quite similar to the Demers case. 
In the Glynn case the intervening negligence of an intermediate car-
rier, i.e., failure to inspect, was held sufficient to excuse from liability 
the defendant who had turned over a defective car to the intermediate 
carrier. It is somewhat doubtful, however, that the Glynn case was 
such "solid rock" in view of some rather tenuous distinctions made 
with reference to it in later cases. Thus in the case of D'Almeida v.'-" 
Boston 6- Maine R.R.,8 decided eleven years after the Glynn case, the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a plaintiff's judgment for injuries 
sustained when a freight car, owned by the defendant, overturned due 
to a defective and unsafe condition in the car. At the time the injury 
occurred the plaintiff's employer was completely in control of the car, 
which it was operating over a spur track. The plaintiff's employer 
had sufficient opportunity to inspect the car for the defect which could 
have been discovered by reasonable diligence. In holding both the 
defendant railroad and the plaintiff's employer liable the Court dis-
tinguished the Glynn case upon the dubious ground that in the. 
D'Almeida case the railroad owned the car and had not received it 
from a connecting railroad to be forwarded. The Court did not make 
clear the distinction between the situation where a railroad transfers.,. 
control of a defective car to another railroad whose employee is thereby 
injured and the situation where it transfers final control of a defective 
car to a consignee to be driven over a spur track and whose employee 
is thereby injured. If ownership of the car is relevant, the Court in 
the Demers case could have distinguished the Glynn case on that point. 
There is clearly a difference of opinion on the question of the lia-
bility of a railroad which turns over a defective car to a connecting 
railroad, which, ignorant of the defect, likewise fails to inspect the car.9 
Some courts hold that the failure of inspection by the second railroad 
is merely concurrent negligence which does not exculpate the first 
carrier, while oJhers, in line with the apparent view of the Massa-
chusetts Court,\lhold that the negligent failure to inspect by the second 
railroad becomes the proximate cause of the injury and relieves the 
first railroad from liability. On principle, this latter view, as expressed 
in the Demers case, appears inconsistent with the decided cases of most 
jurisdictions, including Massachusetts,10 which refuse in other situa-
tions to insulate a defendant from liability, with little inquiry into 
foreseeability, when a third party's intervening conduct is a mere 
7175 Mass. 510, 56 N.E. 698 (1900). 
8209 Mass. 81, 95 N.E. 398 (1911). 
9 See Annotation, 152 A.L.R. 1313 (1944). 
10 Flaherty v. New York, New Haven &: Hartford R.R., 337 Mass. 456. 149 N.E.2d 
670 (1958); Guinan v. Famous Players.Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 
(1929); Leahy v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 Mass. 352, 112 N.E. 950 (1916); 
D'Almeida v. Boston & Maine R.R., 209 Mass. 81, 95 N.E. 398 (1911); Lane v. 
Atlantic Works, III Mass. 136 (1872). 
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failure to averthann to the plaintiff by a proper inspe~tion.ll Perhaps 
the latter view merely reflects a policy concern fOY railroads which 
must, as part of their operations, continually accept ~nd turn over cars 
belonging to other lines, although the courts accepting the latter view 
do not speak in terms of such a policy. 
§3.3. Railroad crossing collisions: Failure of railroad to sound bell 
or whistle. For many years the Supreme Judicial Court has been 
struggling with a statute, G.L., c. 160, §232,1 which is not only con-
fusing but presents somewhat of a contradiction in terms. 
Massachusetts law requires that a bell or whistle be sounded by loco-
motive engines before entering a railroad crossing which is on the 
same level as a public way.2 General Laws, c. 90, §15, requires that 
" ... every person operating a motor vehicle, upon approaching a 
railroad crossing at grade, shall reduce the speed of the vehicle to a 
reasonable and proper rate before proceeding over the crossing, and 
shall proceed over the crossing at such rate of speed and with such 
care as is reasonable and proper under the circumstances." Punish-
ment by fine is provided in the statute for its violation. Prior to a 1951 
amendment, instead of the language "and shall proceed over the cross-
}ng at such rate of speed and with such care as is reasonable and 
proper under the circumstances," the statute used the language "and 
shall proceed cautiously over the crossing." 
The statute which causes difficulty in interpretation, G.L., c. 160, 
§232, reads in part: 
If a person is injured in his person ... by a collision with the 
engines ... of a railroad corporation at a [public grade] crossing 
. . . and it appears that the corporation neglected to give the 
signals required by said section [138] ... and that such neglect 
contributed to the injury, the corporation shall be liable for all 
damages caused by the collision . . . unless it is shown that, in 
addition to a mere want of ordinary care, the person injured ... 
was, at the time of the collision, guilty of gross or wilful negli-
gence or was acting in violation of the law, and that such gross 
or wilful negligence or unlawful act contributed to the injury.3 
At first glance it appears that Section 232 confers upon the injured 
motorist a preferred treatment by ignoring contributory negligence, 
provided such negligence is not gross, where the railroad corporation 
has not complied with G.L., c. 160, §138, by its failure to sound a bell 
or a whistle. However, since most acts of negligence on the part of 
the motorist would apparently violate G.L., c. 90, §15, a penal statute, 
they would fall within the excepting clause of Section 232 "unless the 
person injured ... was, at the time of the collision ... acting in 
11 See 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts §28.IO, at 1555 (1956). 
§3.3. 1 The pertinent matter in this statute is quoted in the text at note 3 infra. 
2 G.L., c. 160, §138. 
11 The substance of this section was originally enacted by Acts of 1871, c. 352. 
5
Smith: Chapter 3: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1959
§3.3 TORTS 35 
violation of the law." Thus the preferred treatment accorded motorists 
in the first portion of Section 232 would seem to be almost completely 
abolished by the latter portion of the statute because of the presence 
of G.L., c. 90, §15. 
Two cases decided during the 1959 SURVEY year, Fay v. Boston 0-
Maine R.R.4 and Borden v. New York, New Haven 0- Hartford R.R.,5 
served not only to highlight the apparent inconsistencies of Section 
232 but to add to the lack of certainty prevalent in the Massachusetts 
cases involving railroad collisions. In the Fay case the plaintiff was 
injured when the automobile which he was driving was struck by a 
train at a public grade crossing. The plaintiff testified that he came 
to a full stop four or five feet from the track, looked to his left and his 
right, and listened. He saw and heard nothing. The view to the 
plaintiff's left, from which direction the train came, was clear up to 
approximately 390 feet. The train which struck the plaintiff's auto-
mobile was made up of a diesel engine and eleven cars and its speed 
was estimated to be from 35 to 40 miles per hour. The plaintiff's 
declaration contained two common law counts for negligence and 
two counts under G.L., c. 160, §232, for failure of the defendant to 
give the statutory signals required by G.L., c. 160, §138. There was a 
finding for the plaintiff by a judge sitting without a jury and the 
defendant brought exceptions to the denial of its requests for rulings. 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the defendant's exceptions and 
ordered judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff was 
negligent as a matter of law,6 and that such negligence not only barred 
a recovery under the common law but also barred plaintiff's recovery 
under G.L., c. 160, §232, since his negligent acts violated G.L., c. 90, 
§15, and thus came within the excepting clause of G.L., c. 160, §232, 
"unless ... the person injured ... was acting in violation of the 
law." 
Assuming the correctness of the Court's determination that the plain-
tiff was negligent as a matter of law,T it appears evident that the posi-
tion taken by the Court with reference to the application of the 
"unless" clause of Section 232 was proper. The statute permits no 
other reasonable interpretation with the possible exception that the 
"unless" clause refers only to the situations in which the plaintiff was 
guilty of gross negligence or his actions in violation of the law were 
serious enough to constitute gross negligence.8 While such an inter-
pretation would no doubt remove the inconsistency in the statute, it 
4 lIlI8 Mass. 5l11, 156 N.E.2d 24 (1959). 
51959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 865,158 N.E.2d 464. 
6 "Whether the plaintiff did not look at all, or whether he looked carelessly and 
failed to see the train, or whether he saw the train and nevertheless decided to 
proceed over the crossing, he was in any event disrgarding the rule of caution 
imposed by the statute." lIlI8 Mass. 5l11, 5!14, 156 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1959). 
T The correctness of this determination was disputed in the dissenting opinion 
in the Fay case. lIlI8 Mass. at 5l16·5l17, 156 N .E.2d at 28. . 
8 Such an interpretation of G.L., c. 160, §2l12, was argued in the dissenting opinion 
in the Fay case. !llI8 Mass. at 540, 156 N .E.2d at lIO. 
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would fail to give meaning to all the words in the statute. This inter-
pretation would render nugatory any reference in the statute to un-
lawful acts since the gross negligence exclusion of the benefits of the 
statute could cover all acts of gross negligence whether or not they 
were in violation of the law. 
In the case of Borden v. New York, New Haven &- Hartford R.R.,9 
the plaintiff was injured when his automobile was struck by a single 
self-propelled Budd car of the defendant at a railroad crossing. The 
estimated speed of the Budd car was about 45 miles per hour. The 
plaintiff testified that he stopped his automobile about six feet from 
the tracks, looked to his right and left and listened. He saw and heard 
nothing. The plaintiff's view to his right, from which direction the 
Budd car was traveling, was clear for about 500 feet. As in the Fay 
case, the plaintiff's declaration contained counts for common law negli-
gence and recovery under G.L., c. 160, §232. The defendant relied 
upon the plaintiff's contributory negligence and a violation by the 
plaintiff of G.L., c. 90, §15. Unlike the Fay case, the Borden case 
came under the 1951 amendment to G.L., c. 90, §15, which had changed 
the language of the statute from "shall proceed cautiously over the 
crossing" to "shall proceed over the crossing at such rate of speed and 
with such care as is reasonable and proper under the circumstances." 
The Court upheld a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the jury 
could have found the plaintiff not guilty of any violation of G.L., c. 
90, §15. In this connection the Court stated: "Borden was entitled to 
rely to some extent on the absence of the usual warning." 10 
It is extremely difficult to distinguish factually the results of the 
Fay and Borden cases. In both cases the plaintiff testified that he 
stopped his automobi~e, looked to his right and left, and saw and 
heard nothing. In the Fay case the plaintiff had a clear view up to 
approximately 390 feet. In the Borden case the clear view was ap-
proximately 500 feet. The difference between the speeds of the trains 
in the two cases was approximately five miles per hour. The only 
apparent distinction between the two cases is that the Fay case was 
decided under G.L., c. 90, §15 prior to the 1951 amendment. Yet the 
",' Court in the Borden case disclaimed the idea that any different stand-
ard is to be applied as a result of the amendment, by stating: 
Perhaps the enactment of St. 1951, c. 557, reflects a belief that 
a requirement to cross with reasonable and proper care in the 
circumstances is less onerous than a requirement to proceed "cau-
tiously." But we do not find the significance of the new statute 
in any change of underlying principle. That principle exists 
apart from any statute. It is that if the plaintiff is shown so to 
have acted that his conduct cannot reasonably be deemed careful 
in the circumstances he is negligent as a matter of law.ll 
9 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 865, 158 N.E.2d 464. 
101959 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 870, 158 N.E.2d at 468. 
11 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 869, 158 N.E.2d at 467. 
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The Court, however, appeared to give some indication that it would 
at least partially resolve the inconsistency present in G.L., c. 160, §232, 
by being less severe in the future in determining whether a plaintiff's 
acts violated G.L., c. 90, §15, as a matter of law, when it further stated: 
"We think the significance of the new statute is that we may approach 
its construction, as applied to facts in cases newly arising under it, 
free of the gloss of those cases decided under the old wording even 
though they may present similar facts." 12 
§3.4. Host-guest passenger relationship: Point of commencement. 
Most of the guest passenger cases that have come before the Supreme 
Judicial Court in recent years have been concerned solely with the 
question of the degree of the defendant's negligence.! The case of 
Motta v. Mello,2 decided during this SURVEY year, involved also the 
problem of the point of time at which the host-guest passenger rela-
tionship arises. 
In the Motta case the defendant, while in his automobile, offered 
to drive the plaintiff home. In order to enter the automobile on the 
passenger's side the plaintiff proceeded to walk around it. It was dark, 
and when the plaintiff stepped from the curbing into the street she 
tripped over an extension of the exhaust pipe which extended two 
feet from the back of the trunk of the automobile. At the close of 
the evidence in the case, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
was denied. Further the judge charged the jury that the evidence in-
dicated that the plaintiff was not a passenger and not in the status of 
a passenger at the moment of her injury. Having saved exceptions 
to both the denial of his motion for a directed verdict and to the 
charge, the defendant appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court sus-
tained the defendant's exceptions and ordered judgment for him, 
holding that the "circumstances fixing the scope of the defendant's 
duty" were "not whether the plaintiff has become a passenger but 
whether the defendant had assumed a gratuitous undertaking to her." 
Since the plaintiff testified that she was on her way to get into the 
automobile and had accepted the defendant's gratuitous undertaking, 
the host-guest passenger relationship had commenced. Since the plain-
tiff had' presented no evidence that would warrant a jury finding of 
gross negligence the trial judge should have granted the defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict. 
While the decision in the Motta case is clearly consistent with prior 
Massachusetts decisions, the case does have one unique feature. In all 
the prior Massachusetts cases cited by the Court, dealing with the ques-
tion of when the host-guest passenger relationship begins, as opposed 
to when it terminates,S the plaintiff was actually in the act of entering 
12 Ibid. 
§3.4. 1 For a 1959 SURVEY year case involving this question, see Pruzynski v. 
Malinowski, 338 Mass. 58, 153 N.E.2d 640 (1958). 
2338 Mass. 170, 154 N.E.2d 364 (1958). 
3 Lanza v. Scarpa, 336 Mass. 629, 146 N.E.2d 899 (1958); Ruel v. Langelier, 299 
Mass. 240,12 N.E.2d 735 (1938). 
J 
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the automobile.. In the Motta case the plaintiff had not yet reached 
the door of the automobile when the injury occurred. The general 
language of these prior Massachusetts cases, however, would seem to 
cover the situation in the Motta case.1I 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Motta case was the plain-
tiff's argument that the Court adopt the same standard in detennining 
when the host-guest passenger relationship arises as has been applied 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in detennining when the relationship 
of common carrier-passenger commences. In the case of Duchemin v. 
Boston Elevated Railway Co.}) the Court, dealing with the question 
of when the common carrier-passenger relationship commences, stated: 
. "We think that a present intention of becoming a passenger as soon 
as he can reach the car neither makes the person who is approaching 
the car with that intention a passenger, nor changes as to him the 
degree of care to be exercised." T The plaintiff's argument, however, 
was not novel. It had been rejected earlier by the Court in the case 
of Head v. Morton8 on the basis that, since the relationship between 
the common carrier and passenger presupposes a contractual basis 
and the obligation of the fonner as to the care of the latter is of such 
an onerous nature, the situation is not the same as the host-guest pas-
senger relationship. The Court in the Motta case refused to budge 
from this position. 
§3.5. Res ipsa loquitur: Exploding bottles. Although the Su-
preme Judicial Court has in recent years studiously avoided use of 
the phrase "res ipsa loquitur," as being an instrument of confusion 
rather than of clarity, it has not been remiss in allowing recoveries 
• Head v. Morton, 1102 Mass. 2711, 19 N.E.2d 22 (19119). A possible exception is 
the case of Donahue v. Kelley, !I06 Mass. 511, 29 N.E.2d 10 (1940), where the 
defendant had driven the plaintiff to the home of a mutual friend intending also 
to drive her back after the visit. After leaving the friend's home the defendant 
struck the plaintiff with his automobile while attempting to bring it into a position 
for the plaintiff to enter. It is difficult to determine whether the Court's holding 
that a host-guest passenger relationship existed at the time of the injury was 
based upon the fact that the relationship, having been established prior to their 
visit, had not yet terminated or that the original host-guest passenger relationship 
had terminated, but a new such relationship had commenced at the time of the 
injury. In light of the case of Fone v. Elloian, 297 MasS. IlI9, 7 N.E.2d 7117 (19117). 
cited by the Court in the Donahue case, it would appear that the latter view was 
the one accepted. 
II In the case of Ruel v. Langelier, 299 Mass. 240, 242, 12 N.E.2d 7115, 7116 (19118), the 
Court stated: "The degree of the defendant's duty does not depend upon the 
physical position of the plaintiff at the moment of the accident, or upon whether 
she was then in the defendant's automobile or outside of it, or upon whether in 
everyday language ·she would be described as a guest. The degree of the defendant'S 
duty depends upon whether the act of· the defendant claimed to be negligent was 
an act performed in the course of carrying out the gratuitous undertaking which 
the defendant had assumed." 
8186 Mass. 11511, 71 N.E. 780 (1904). 
7186 Mass. at 1157, 71 N.E. at 782. 
8802 Mass. 2711,278,279, 19 N.E.2d 22, 24 (19119)~ 
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based solely upon circumstantial evidence.1 Throughout these deci-
sions the Court has silently reaffirmed its position that the rule of res -
ipsa loquitur, however denominated, does no more than recognize 
that negligence and causation, like other facts, may be established by 
circumstantial evidence. 
In a recent case, Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling CO.,2 the Court 
took the opportunity to re-examine its position with reference to one 
of the more common occurrences generally categorized as a "res ipsa 
case" - the exploding carbonated beverage bottle. The plaintiff in 
the Evangelio case, while assisting her husband in the operation of 
his variety store, was injured when an unopened Pepsi-Cola bottle 
exploded in her hand. The bottle had been delivered to the store 
by the defendant's employee approximately fifteen minutes prior to 
the explosion. In a suit brought against the defendant bottler, the 
plaintiff introduced evidence of both her own due care in handling 
the bottle and of the fact that nothing had touched the bottle subse-
quent to its delivery, failing, however, to offer evidence as to the 
identity of the bottle manufacturer, the degree of carbonation of the 
beverage or its ingredients, or the standard of care employed in its 
manufacture. Upon a denial of its motion for judgment on the audi-
tor's report and the granting of plaintiff's motion for judgment, the 
defendant brought exceptions, relying principally upon two Massa-
chusetts decisions, Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling CO.3 and Howard v. 
Lowell Coca Cola Bottling CO.4 
In the Ruffin case the plaintiff, a patron in a delicatessen store, was 
injured by the explosion of a chilled bottle of Coca-Cola as he re-
moved it from the ice chest. In the course of his testimony, the plain-
tiff was unwilling to state that the bottle had not hit "another bottle 
or piece of tin" II as he lifted it from the container. The testimony of 
the store proprietor was to the effect that he always handled the bottles 
carefully while placing them in the container. The Court sustained 
the defendant's exceptions to the denial of his motion for a directed 
verdict on the grounds that since the plaintiff had not excluded cer-
tain other causes for the explosion, such as the cracking of the bottle 
because of contact with the ice in the container, or the plaintiff's im-
proper handling in removing the bottle from the container, the jury 
would not be warranted in finding that it was more probable that the 
plaintiff's injury was caused by an act for which the defendant was 
responsible than by other causes for which it was not responsible. 
The plaintiff in the Howard case was injured when a bottle of Coca-
§!I.5. 1 Fitchburg Gas Be Electric Light Co. v. Samuel Evans Construction Co., 
!I!I8 Mass. 752, 157 N.E.2d 529 (1959); Poulin v. H. A. Tobey Lumber Corp., !l1I7 
Mass. 146, 148 N.E.2d 277 (1958); Di Roberto v. Lagasse, lIlI6 Mass. lI09, 145 N.E.2d 
8!14 (1957). 
21959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 767, 158 N.E.2d lI42. 
a lIll Mass. 514,42 N.E.2d 259 (1942). 
41122 Mass. 456, 78 N.E.2d 7 (1948). 
"!Ill Mass. 514, 515, 42 N.E.2d 259, 260 (1942). 
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Cola, which she had just purchased from a coin·operated vending 
machine, broke in her hand. While the plaintiff in a suit against the 
bottler introduced evidence of her own due care, like the plaintiff in 
the Evangelio case she failed to offer any evidence of specific acts of 
negligence by the defendant. Since the vending machine was owned 
and operated by the defendant there was no necessity for plaintiff 
to show proper handling of the bottle by an intermediate dealer. The 
Court held that it was error to deny the defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict, holding that the plaintiff had failed to show, by a 
preponderance of evidence, a greater likelihood that her injuries re-
sulted from an act of negligence for which the defendant was respon-
sible than from a cause for which it was not liable.6 
The Court in the Evangelio case distinguished the Ruffin case by 
reason of the plaintiff's failure in that case to exclude the possibility 
of damage to' the bottle through negligent handling after it had passed 
from the control of the defendant, and declined to follow the Howard 
decision. Thus the Massachusetts Court joined the rapidly growing 
number of jurisdictions7 that hold that the explosion of even a single 
bottle of carbonated beverage is sufficient to permit an inference of 
negligence of the bottler, provided it is shown that the bottle was 
not improperly handled after the bottler surrendered control of it. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's change of position in the Evangelio 
case appears sound. The plaintiff relying solely upon circumstantial 
evidence is not required to exclude all causes except the defendant's 
negligence and it is sufficient if upon the entire evidence there was a 
greater likelihood that the accident was due to the defendant's negli-
gence than to some other cause.S The most probable causes for an 
exploding bottle are: (I) undiscovered manufacturing defects in the 
bottle; (2) defects caused by improper handling of the bottle; and (3) 
excessive carbonation. Expert testimony submitted in several cases 
involving exploding bottles in other jurisdictions indicates that there 
is available to the glass manufacturing industry a method of testing 
bottles for defects not apparent to the eye which is considered almost 
infallible, and which is commonly used by glass manufacturers.o 
Further, a recent study of a large number of bottles alleged to have 
exploded discloses that approximately only two per cent break because 
"the bottles are defective due to manufacturers' defects." 10 It is, of 
course, quite possible for bottles to become defective through mis-
handling while being shipped from the glass manufacturer to the 
6 For a discussion of the Howard case, see 28 B.U.L. Rev. 490 (1948). 
7 See Annotation, 4 A.L.R.2d 466, 468 (1949), where it is stated that the general 
trend" ... allows the application of the rule where the plaintiff is able to produce 
evidence sufficient to negative the possibility of negligence on the part of all 
persons through whose hands the soft drink passed after leaving the control of the 
defendant." 
S Di Roberto v. Lagasse, 336 Mass. 309, 145 N.E.2d 834 (1957). 
OSee Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 460, 150 P.2d 
436,440 (1944). 
10 Dingwall, Exploding Bottles, 11 NACCA L.J. 158, 162 (1953). 
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bottler, but such defects should ordinarily be discovered by a reason-
able inspection by the bottler. With such a slight degree of proba-
bility that the explosion of the bottle was due to some act on the part 
of the bottle manufacturer, not discoverable by the bottler by a reason-
able inspection, coupled with the fact that it is incumbent upon the 
plaintiff to show that the bottle had not been improperly handled 
since it left the control of the defendant, it would appear quite proper 
to permit a fact finding tribunal to infer, on facts similar to the 
Evangelio and Howard cases, that the explosion would not have hap· 
pened unless the defendant bottler had been negligent. 
Despite the Court's holding in the Evangelio case, the plaintiff in 
an "exploding bottle" case still encounters a difficult hurdle in at-
tempting to have his case submitted to the jury; he must show that 
the bottle had not been improperly handled by himself or by inter-
mediate handlers. This task is particularly onerous when the plaintiff 
is a consumer rather than the intermediate dealer, as was the situation 
in the Ruffin case. It is a matter of common knowledge that store-
keepers do not handle cases containing beverage bottles in the most 
gentle manner. Further, the possibility that the glass may have 
cracked as a result of the bottle being placed in contact with ice would 
appear extremely difficult to overcome. Finally, it is probably a rare 
case where a customer could honestly testify that the bottle had not 
come in contact with other bottles as it was removed from the ice 
container. If the bottle is removed from the store it is practically 
certain that it will come into contact with other objects. It may be 
argued that since the allowance of recovery for bottles exploding af~er 
having left the control of the bottler is itself an exception to the strict 
concept of res ipsa loquitur, the exception should be rigidly limited. 
On the other hand, if the exception is to have any value it should 
take realities into consideration. 
It is difficult to predict how far a plaintiff must go in order to sus-
tain a showing that the bottle had not been improperly handled after 
leaving the control of the bottler. It would seem that recovery should 
not be denied solely because the bottle had been subjected to some-
thing less than scrupulous handling which would include slight con-
tacts with such objects as other bottles, ice and bottle containers. l1 
11 For cases which have gone to the opposite extreme from the Ruffin case, see 
Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Crow, 200 Tenn. 161,291 S.W.2d 589 (1956), hold-
ing that the case was properly submitted to the jury although the plaintiff had 
transported the bottle with other bottles in a truck for half a mile, including two 
hundred yards of graveled road, had placed the bottles in a container with ice, 
and had lifted the container from the truck to a shady spot; Weggman v. Seven-Up 
Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93 N.W.2d 467 (1958), holding that the case was properly 
submitted to the jury although a small boy was playing with the bottle and other 
bottles just prior to the explosion. Compare, however, Burkett v. Panama City 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 93 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1957), and Keefer v. Logan Coca Cola 
Bottling Works, 141 W. Va. 839, 93 S.E.2d 225 (1956), which were cases where the 
plaintiff had allowed the exploding bottle to fall to the floor of a moving auto-
mobile. 
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§3.6. Tort liability of charities. In a recent case, Simpson v. 
Truesdale Hospital, Inc.,! the Supreme Judicial Court again refused 
to abrogate its long-standing rule of complete civil immunity for chari-
table organizations. This decision, although contrary to the recent 
country-wide trend toward removing this cloak of immunity in whole 
or in part,2 affirms the position taken by the Court in the 1953 case of 
Mastrangelo v. Maverick Dispensary.s 
In a discussion of the Mastrangelo case in the 1954 SURVEY· it was 
indicated that Massachusetts was one of only ten jurisdictions that had 
retained the rule of absolute immunity.1> Since then two of these ten 
jurisdictions, Kentucky and Idaho, have repudiated the rule,6 four 
have affirmed the rule,7 and in the remaining four jurisdictions no 
decisions have been handed down. 
It is worthy of note that in the Simpson case the Court stated: 
"While as an original proposition the doctrine might not commend 
itself to us today, it has been firmly imbedded in our law for over 
three quarters of a century and we think that its termination should 
be at legislative rather than judicial hands." 8 This statement by the 
Court reflects an underlying consideration which is in conflict with 
its desire to abolish the rule. Should the judiciary rather than the 
legislature abolish the rule it might have the effect of subjecting a 
charitable organization to tort liability for acts committed prior to 
the judicial abolition but within the period of the statute of limita-
tions, where the charitable organization, having relied upon the com-
'plete charitable immunity doctrine, is uninsured. Abolition by the 
legislature, on the other hand, would operate prospectively.1I 
B. LEGISLATION 
§3.7. Proposed legislation in blasting cases. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court has long adhered to the principle that "one carrying on 
§3.6. 1338 Mass. 787, 154 N.E.2d 357 (1958). 
2 See Annotation, 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952). 
8330 Mass. 708, 115 N.E.2d 455 (1953) . 
• 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.5. 
I> Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. 
6 Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d 1041 
(1956); Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957). 
7 Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, Inc., 338 Mass. 787, 154 N.E.2d 357 (1958); 
Cabbiness v. City of North Little Rock, 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957); Gorman 
v. St. Paul Fire So: Marine Ins. Co., 210 Md. 1, 121 A.2d 812 (1956); Knecht v. St. 
Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958). 
81958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1279, 1280, 154 N.E.2d 357, 358. 
II In Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957), the Court of Appeals of 
New York rejected this stare decisis argument stating:· "To the suggestion that stare 
decisis compels us to perpetuate it until the legislature acts, a ready answer is at 
hand. It was intended not to effect a 'petrifying rigidity,' but to assure the justice 
that flows from certainty and stability. If, instead, adherence to precedent offers 
not justice but unfairness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its 
right to survive, and no principle constrains us to follow it." 
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blasting operations is liable without proof of negligence for all direct 
injuries to the property of another, as where stones or debris are cast 
upon it; but in the absence of negligence there is no liability for con-
sequential harm such as is caused by concussion or vibration." 1 While 
the Court has persisted in its adherence to this vestige of the common 
law distinction between trespass and trespass on the case,2 the Massa-
chusetts legislature has taken steps to study the problem. Chapter 
142 of the Resolves of 1958 provided for a commission to study and 
make recommendations with reference to Public Document No. 144,3 
which relates to providing that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be 
applicable in actions for damages caused by blasting, and to 1958 
House Document No. 1298, relative to extending the common law 
rule of liability irrespective of negligence for rocks thrown by blasting 
to damage caused by concussion. 
In Public Document No. 144 the Judicial Council refused to recom-
mend the proposal that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be made ap-
plicable by statute to blasting cases. This decision appears wise. 
There would be no purpose in introducing this doctrine by statute 
into blasting cases.· Serious consideration, however, should be given 
to the proposal of applying a strict liability doctrine for damages 
caused by blasting whether such damages result from throwing of 
debris or from concussion. 
§3.8. Unregistered and improperly registered motor vehicles: Abo-
lition of trespasser doctrine. Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1959 provides 
that the failure to register or the improper registration of a motor 
vehicle shall not be deemed to render the vehicle a nuisance or to 
render any person a trespasser upon a way. Prior to the passage of this 
act, if improper registration was specifically pleaded as a defense, it 
as a matter of law barred recovery by the operator of the vehicle unless 
he could show willful, wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the 
defendant.l If the violation was not specifically pleaded, it was, none-
theless, evidence of contributory negligence.2 As a defendant, the 
operator of an improperly registered vehicle was considered as creating 
§3.7. 1 Coughlan v. Grande &: Son, Inc., 332 Mass. 464, 467, 125 N.E.2d 778, 780 
(1955). 
2 For a criticism of this view see 2 Harper &: James, The Law of Torts §14.7 
(1956). Although no cases were decided during this SURVEY year in Massachusetts 
on the basis of this distinction, the Supreme Judicial Court, in the case of Kushner 
v. Dravo Corp., 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 158 N.E.2d 858, was presented with an 
opportunity to abolish the rule, which it failed to do. 
B At pages 28-31 (1957). 
4 The Judicial Council, in their Thirty-third Report (1957), Pub. Doc. No. 144, 
pp. 28-31 (1957), in commenting on the proposed act to provide "that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur shall be applicable in actions for damages caused by blast-
ing ... " stated: " ... the proposal to insert the phrase 'res ipsa loquitur' in our 
statutory law indicates a misunderstanding of the rule of evidence ... which 
already operates without statute ... in blasting cases as in any other cases so that 
no legislation is necessary and its insertion would be meaningless." 
§3.8. 1 Potter v. Gilmore, 282 Mass. 49,184 N.E. 373 (1933). 
2 Commingford v. Cote, 308 Mass. 472, 32 N .E.2d 692 (1941). 
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a nuisance on the highway and was liable for all direct injury resulting 
from vehicle operation, although injury was not the result of any act 
of negligence.s 
Under Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1959, the operator of a motor 
vehicle not legally registered is no longer required to show willful, 
wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the defendant in order to 
recover for harm to person or property. As a defendant such an oper-
ator will not be liable for harm to person or property irrespective of 
negligence. Chapter 259 provides, however, that a violation of G.L., 
c. 90, §9, shall be deemed evidence of negligence. 
8 Capano v. Melchionno. 297 Mass. 1.7 N.E.2d 593 (1937); Balian v. Ogassian. 277 
Mass. 525.179 N.E. 232.78 A.L.R. 1021 (1931). 
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